Schaffer On Absences by Stepanians, Markus
		
Why	Schaffer’s	solution	to	the	problem	of	absence	causation	fails1		Markus	Stepanians,	University	of	Bern			 Never	shall	this	thought	prevail,	that	not-being	is	[causal]:	Nay:	keep	your	mind	from	this	path	of	investigation.												(Adapted	from	Parmenides)		
1.	Moore’s	ontological	argument	for	No	Absences	Michael	Moore’s	view	of	causation	in	Causation	and	Responsibility	(Oxford	Universi-ty	Press	2009)	is	shaped	by	two	assumptions:	
Essential	Relationality:		 Causation	 is	 a	 dyadic	 relation	between	 a	 cause	 and	 an	effect.		
Causal	Realism:		 	 Causation	is	something	‘in’	the	world.		
Essential	Relationality	and	Causal	Realism	together	imply	that	causal	relata	are	part	of	 the	 (mind-independent)	world,	and	since	 the	world	 is	 for	Moore	 the	 totality	of	spatio-temporal	 particulars,	 it	 follows	 that	 causal	 relata	must	 be	 spatio-temporal	particulars.	Moreover,	Moore	in	effect	endorses	Parmenides’	dunning	words	about	non-being:	 “[T]here	 is	 the	hard-to-dispute	 truth	of	 general	ontology:	 there	are	no	negative	properties,	 no	negative	 events,	 and	no	negative	 states	of	 affairs”	 (Moore	2009,	 460).	Moore	 concludes	 from	 this	 hard-to-dispute	 truth	 of	 general	 ontology	that	non-existent	spatio-temporal	particulars	–	“absences”,	including	absent	actions	(“omissions”)	–	are	unfit	for	the	role	of	causal	relata:	“Absences,	thus,	cannot	stand	in	the	singular	causal	relation	…	for	the	simple	reason	that	they	are	not	particulars”	(ibid.).	With	other	words,	never	shall	this	thought	prevail,	that	not-being	is	causal.	In	Schaffer’s	words:	
No	Absences:	 Absences	cannot	serve	as	causes	or	effects.	Moore’s	ontological	argument	for	No	Absences	comes	down	to	this:	Given	Essential	
Relationality	and	Causal	Realism,	only	spatio-temporal	particulars	can	play	the	role	of	causal	relata.	But	absences	are	not	spatio-temporal	particulars.	It	follows	that	ab-sences	cannot	play	the	role	of	causal	relata,	and	causal	sentences2	that	say	or	imply	otherwise	cannot	be	true.																																																										1	I	am	grateful	to	Jonathan	Schaffer	and	Michael	Moore	for	helpful	discussions	and	comments.	2	By	a	“causal	sentence”	I	mean	in	this	paper	a	sentence	of	the	form	“a	causes	b”	which	can	be	used	to	report	an	instance	of	causation.	
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2.	A	semantic	argument	for	No	Absences	The	last	remark	suggests	that	Moore’s	ontological	argument	for	No	Absences	can	be	supplemented	with	a	semantic	argument	that	exploits	the	intrinsic	connection	be-tween	truth	and	reference.	If,	as	Essential	Relationality	has	it,	causation	is	a	dyadic	relation	causal	sentences	have	the	logical	form	“a	causes	b”,	where	“a”	and	“b”	refer	to	causal	relata.	For	a	causal	sentence	“a	causes	b”	to	be	true,	both	singular	terms	“a”	and	“b”	have	to	refer.	They	cannot	be	empty	since	truth	presupposes	reference,	and	a	 singular	 term’s	 lack	a	 reference	 is	a	 semantic	defect	 that	prevents	any	sen-tence	containing	it	from	being	true.	Conversely,	if	“a	causes	b”	is	true,	then	the	two	existential	conclusions	“There	is	something	that	causes	b”	and	“There	is	something	that	is	caused	by	a”	are	true,	too.	These	inferences	are	licensed	by	the	logical	rule	of	existential	instantiation.	Following	Moore’s	(not	too	happy)	terminological	sugges-tion	that	causal	sentences	that	contain	at	 least	one	empty	singular	term	are	about	“absences”,	we	can	call	causal	sentences	that	suffer	from	this	semantic	defect	“caus-al	absence	sentences”.3		Causal	 absence	 sentences	with	 this	 semantic	 defect	 are	 necessarily	 untrue	since	they	fail	to	fulfill	the	existential	presuppositions	of	truth	(and	falsity,	for	that	matter).	This	gives	us	another	argument	 for	No	Absences.	For,	 the	hard-to-dispute	semantic	truth	that	true	causal	sentences	presuppose	that	their	singular	terms	refer	is	 the	 semantic	 counterpart	 of	Moore’s	 hard-to-dispute	 ontological	 truth	 that	 the	being	of	causation	presupposes	the	being	of	causal	relata,	from	which	Moore	infers	the	truth	of	No	Absences.			
3.	A	logical	argument	for	No	Absences	Further	support	 for	No	Absences	 comes	 from	the	philosophy	of	 logic.	What	makes	Moore’s	hard-to-dispute	truth	of	general	ontology	so	hard	to	dispute	is	not	only	that	there	are	no	negative	particulars,	but	that	there	cannot	be	–	at	least	not	if	we	accept	modern	 logic’s	 standard	 account	 of	 negation	 as	 a	 truth-function.	 On	 the	 truth-functional	account,	what	is	negated	–	the	object	of	negation	–	is	always	and	exclu-sively	something	true	or	false,	a	proposition.	At	the	linguistic	level,	the	“not”	of	or-																																																								3	“Not	too	happy”	because	“about”	is	a	treacherous	little	word	in	this	context.	We	have	to	keep	firmly	in	mind	that	sentences	with	empty	singular	terms	are	not	“about”	anything	in	the	way	that	sentences	with	referring	singulars	terms	may	be	said	to	be	about	something.		
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dinary	English	 is	a	 truth-functional	negation	operator	that	applies	only	and	exclu-sively	 to	expressions	of	 true	or	 false	propositions,	 i.	 e.	 (assertoric)	 sentences.	 It	 is	best	read	as	the	sentential	negator	“it	is	not	the	case	that	…	”.	The	gap	“…”	indicates	a	place-holder	for	a	complete	sentence	“p”.	It	follows	that	“it	is	not	the	case	that	a	is	
F”	 is	 grammatical	 and	meaningful,	 but	 any	 attempt	 to	 close	 the	 gap	 with	 a	 sub-sentential	expression	–	be	 it	a	singular	 term	(as	 in	“it	 is	not	 the	case	that	a”)	or	a	predicate	(as	in	“it	is	not	the	case	that	F”)	–	produces	ungrammatical	nonsense.	At	the	ontological	level	this	means	that	only	propositions	can	be	said	to	be	negative	in	the	 sense	 of	 having	 the	 form	 “non-p”.	 Talk	 of	 negative	 particulars	 (“non-a’s”)	 or	negative	properties	 (“non-F’s”)	 is	 either	 reducible	 to	 talk	 about	negative	proposi-tions	or	 it	 is	nonsensical.	Only	 truths	and	 falsities	can	be	negative,	but	 truths	and	falsities	are	not	particulars,	and	a	fortiori	they	are	not	spatio-temporal	particulars.	However,	if	only	propositions	can	be	negative,	and	only	spatio-temporal	particulars	can	be	causal,	nothing	negative	can	be	causal	and	nothing	causal	 can	be	negative.	Hence	No	Absences.		
4.	What	is	at	issue	between	Schaffer	and	Moore?	It	 seems,	 then,	 that	Moore’s	No	Absences	 is	 a	 hard-to-dispute	 truth	 for	many	 rea-sons,	ontological,	 semantic	and	 logical.	 It	 therefore	comes	as	a	surprise	 that	 Jona-than	Schaffer’s	declared	aim	in	“Disconnection	and	Responsibility:	On	Moore’s	Cau-
sation	and	Responsibility”	(this	journal)	is	to	dispute	it:	“I	will	dispute	Moore’s	claim	that	…	causation	does	not	allow	absences	as	causes	or	effects”.4	Rather	than	a	hard-to-dispute	truth,	Schaffer	suggests	that	No	Absences	is	an	evident	falsehood	“since	it	is	obvious	that	absences	can	be	causal”	(4.).	He	alleges	that	No	Absences	 is	proven	wrong	in	a	practical	way	by	the	time-honored	work	of	executioners:	“No	Absences	…	mishandles	paradigm	cases	of	causation,	such	as	cases	of	beheadings.	Decapitation	can	cause	death,	if	anything	can.	Yet	death	by	decapitation	belongs	to	a	class	of	cas-es	…	which	involve	absences	as	causal	intermediaries”	(2.).		In	what	 sense	 do	 beheadings	 “involve”	 absences	 as	 causal	 intermediaries?	Here	is	Schaffer’s	account	of	the	causal	mechanics	of	a	beheading:		
																																																								4	All	references	are	to	sections	of	Schaffer’s	“Disconnection	and	Responsibility:	On	Moore’s	Causation	and	Responsibility”,	forthcoming	in	Legal	Theory,	and	available	at	http://www.jonathanschaffer.org-/moore.pdf	
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“When	Killer	beheads	Victim,	consider	the	way	 in	which	this	causes	Victim	to	die.	What	happens	 is	 that	 the	 flow	of	oxygenated	blood	which	was	sustaining	Victim’s	life	has	been	disconnected.	 In	other	words,	 there	 is	a	 step	of	prevention—the	be-heading	causes	the	absence	of	blood	flow	to	Victim’s	brain—followed	by	a	step	of	omission—the	absence	of	blood	flow	to	Victim’s	brain	causes	death”	(2.2).	This	is	how	beheadings	supposedly	work:	The	swift	severing	of	the	head	from	the	body	causes	an	absence	–	a	lack	of	blood	in	the	brain	–	which	in	turn	causes	death.	If	this	account	were	literally	correct,	beheadings	would	prove,	pace	Moore	and	No	Ab-
sences,	 that	absences	can	be	effects	as	well	as	causes.	The	argument	would	go	like	this:		Beheadings	can	cause	death	–	and	usually	do.		But	beheadings	involve	absences	as	causal	 intermediaries,	 i.	e.	absences	appear	in	them	as	causes	and	as	effects.	Therefore,	absences	can	serve	as	causes	and	as	effects.	Therefore,	No	Absences	is	false.	However,	despite	Schaffer’s	repeated	suggestions	to	the	contrary,	this	is	not	his	ar-gument.	 It	cannot	be	 for	the	simple	reason	that	Schaffer	agrees	with	Moore	about	the	truth	of	No	Absences.	It	is	important	to	note	from	the	outset	that,	although	Schaf-fer	says	that	he	wishes	to	dispute	No	Absences,	and	holds	that	beheadings	and	simi-lar	 events	 are	 counterexamples	 to	 it,	 and	 that	 absences	 can	be	 causal,	 he	 accepts	that	 absences	 cannot	 stand	 in	 causal	 relations	 and	 that	 genuine	 causal	 absence	claims	 are	 necessarily	 untrue.	A	 clear	 indication	 of	 Schaffer’s	 acceptance	 of	 these	Moorean	theses	is	his	endorsement	of	what	he	calls	Moore’s	“metaphysical	premise	…	that	only	actual	concrete	entities	(such	as	actual	events)	are	eligible	to	serve	as	causal	 relata”	 (4.1).	 Schaffer	 says	 that	 this	 is	 “controversial,	 though	 still	 probably	true”.5	However,	 if	Moore’s	metaphysical	 premise	 is	 (probably)	 true,	 so	 is	No	Ab-
sences,	 since	 the	 former	 implies	 the	 latter.	 If	 only	 “actual	 concrete	 entities”	 –	Moore’s	spatio-temporal	particulars	–	can	be	causal	relata,	absences	don’t	qualify.	The	truth	of	Moore’s	metaphysical	premise	guarantees	the	truth	of	No	Absences,	and	Schaffer	is	committed	to	both.		But	if	No	Absences	is	not	controversial	between	Moore	and	Schaffer,	what	is?	Far	 too	 late,	 towards	 the	 end	 of	 his	 paper,	 Schaffer	 admits	 that	 his	 disagreement																																																									5	 Ibid.	 –	As	his	 discussion	 in	4.3	makes	 clear,	 Schaffer’s	 reason	 for	 thinking	Moore’s	metaphysical	premise	 to	be	controversial	 is	not	Moore’s	 requirement	 that	causation	should	relate	existents,	but	that	it	relates	“concrete”,	i.	e.	spatio-temporal	existents.	Schaffer	thinks	that	the	alternative	view	that	causation	is	a	relation	between	non-spatio-temporal	or	abstract	entities,	propositions	in	particular,	to	be	more	defensible	than	Moore	seems	to	allow.	
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with	Moore	“over	No	Absences	was	partly	verbal”;	and	that	it	“is	best	understood	as	a	 linguistic	dispute”	concerning	 talk	about	absences	(4.2.4).	More	precisely,	 it	 is	a	semantic	dispute	about	the	meaning	and	reference	of	what	Schaffer	calls	“omission	claims”.	 Schaffer’s	 invocation	of	beheadings	 is	not	meant	 to	 cast	doubt	on	No	Ab-
sences.	Rather,	it	is	meant	to	highlight	a	fact	about	our	ordinary	way	of	thinking	and	speaking	that	needs	to	be	reconciled	with	the	truth	of	No	Absences:	That	we	often	take	what	seem	to	be	paradigmatic	examples	of	causal	absence	sentences	to	be	true	–	and	sometimes	rightly	so.	For	example,	a	coroner	asked	to	diagnose	the	cause	of	death	 of	 Charles	 I.	 of	 England,	 might	 say:	 “The	 beheading	 caused	 an	 absence	 of	blood	in	Charles’s	brain,	and	the	absence	of	blood	caused	him	to	die”.	This	seems	to	be	a	causal	sentence	of	the	form	“a	caused	b,	and	b	caused	c”.	The	coroner’s	asser-tion	aims	at	truth.	It	may	be	false,	of	course,	since	Charles	may	have	in	fact	died,	say,	of	a	heart	attack	a	second	before	the	axe	fell.	But	it	is	hard	to	believe	that	the	coro-ner’s	 diagnosis	 could	 not	 be	 true	 for	 the	 reason	 that	 absences	 cannot	 cause	 any-thing.		This,	then,	is	the	dilemma	Schaffer	thinks	Moore’s	metaphysics	of	causation	poses	and	fails	to	dispel.	On	the	one	hand,	No	Absences	seems	plausible.	However,	if	so,	no	causal	absence	sentence	can	be	true.	On	the	other	hand,	it	seems	no	less	plau-sible,	and	is	in	any	case	taken	for	granted	in	everyday	thought	and	discourse,	that	some	causal	 absence	 sentences	 can	be	 true	and	often	are	–	 in	 Schaffer’s	 (literally	false	and	therefore	misleading)	words,	that	“it	is	obvious	that	absences	are	causal”	(4.).	 In	 short,	 Schaffer’s	puzzle	 is	 that	 these	 three	 theses	 seem	plausible	by	 them-selves	but	cannot	be	true	together:	
No	Absences:			 Absences	cannot	serve	as	causes	or	effects.	
About	Absences:		 All	 causal	 absence	 sentences	 say	 of	 some	 absence	 that	 it	 is	causal.	
Possible	Truth:		 It	is	possible	for	a	causal	absence	sentence	to	be	true.	How	 is	 it	possible	 for	a	 causal	 absence	 sentence	 to	be	 true	 if	 causal	 absence	 sen-tences	are	necessarily	untrue	for	 lack	of	reference	of	at	 least	one	of	 their	singular	terms?			
		
6	
5.	Causal	absence	sentences	about	presences	The	answer	is	that	it	is	not	possible.	If	absences	are	by	nature	causally	impotent,	a	sentence	 saying	 otherwise	 cannot	 be	 true.	 As	 formulated	 in	 the	 last	 paragraph,	Schaffer’s	puzzle	has	no	solution.	Since	Schaffer	accepts	No	Absences	and	takes	Pos-
sible	Truth	as	his	basic	datum,	he	has	no	choice	but	to	reject	About	Absences.	Schaf-fer’s	axiomatic	starting	point	is	Possible	Truth	as	exemplified	in	causal	absence	sen-tences	like	“The	absence	of	blood	in	Charles’s	brain	caused	his	death”	or	“The	gar-dener’s	omission	to	water	my	flowers	caused	them	to	wilt”.	If	such	sentences	can	be	true,	 and	 possible	 truth	 presupposes	 reference,	 then	 the	 singular	 terms	 “the	 ab-sence	of	blood	in	Charles’s	brain”	and	“the	gardener’s	omission	to	water	my	flow-ers”	must	refer.	But	then	About	Absences	must	be	false.	It	has	to	be	replaced	by:	
About	Absences*		 Some	causal	absence	sentences	are	about	presences.		Thus,	the	point	of	Schaffer’s	insistence	on	his	basic	datum	is	not	to	cast	doubt	on	No	
Absences,	but	to	argue	for	the	replacement	of	About	Absences	with	About	Absences*.		
About	Absences*	seems	paradoxical	–	how	can	a	causal	absence	sentence	be	about	a	presence?	The	source	of	 this	misgiving	 is	 the	presumption	 that	causal	ab-sence	 sentences	must	 be	 about	 absences.	 However,	 according	 to	 the	 explanation	given	in	§2,	a	causal	sentence	of	the	form	“a	causes	b”	is	a	causal	absence	sentence	if	it	contains	at	least	one	empty	singular	term.	Being	about	an	absence	is	sufficient	for	being	a	 causal	 absence	 sentence,	but	 it	 is	not	necessary.	There	may	be	 causal	 ab-sence	sentences	whose	singular	terms	refer	to	presences.	The	reason	it	may	still	be	appropriate	to	call	them	causal	“absence”	sentences	is	that	by	dint	of	their	wording	and	choice	of	 (singular)	 terms	 they	claim	or	purport	 to	be	about	absences.	 If	 sen-tences	such	as	“The	absence	of	blood	in	Charles’s	brain	caused	his	death”	and	“The	gardener’s	 omission	 to	water	my	 flowers	 caused	 them	 to	wilt”	 can	 be	 true,	 they	must	 be	 about	 presences,	 but	 –	 oddly	 enough,	 to	 be	 sure	 –	 they	 refer	 to	 these	presences	as	“the	absence	of	blood	in	Charles’s	brain”	and	as	“the	gardener’s	omis-sion”.	Thus,	although	such	sentences	refer	in	fact	to	presences,	they	may	be	called	causal	 “absence”	 sentences	 in	 view	 of	 their	 use	 of	 terms	 like	 “absence”	 or	 “omis-sion”.	 It	 may	 help	 to	 mitigate	 the	 terminological	 hardship	 somewhat	 to	 follow	Schaffer’s	 practice	 of	 speaking	 of	 these	 sentences	 as	 expressing	 “claims”.6	 Causal																																																									6	However,	in	my	use,	“claim”	refers	primarily	to	propositions,	and	only	in	a	derivative	and	second-
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absence	 claims	 purport	 or	 claim	 to	 be	 about	 absences,	 but	 may	 not	 be.	 If	 about	
About	Absences*	is	correct,	some	of	them	are	about	presences.		
6.	The	semantics	of	causal	omission	sentences	The	question	 is:	How	is	 it	possible	 for	 typical	causal	absence	claims	as	expressed,	for	example,	in	“The	absence	of	blood	in	Charles’s	brain	caused	his	death”	or	in	“The	gardener’s	 omission	 to	 water	 my	 flowers	 caused	 them	 to	 wilt”	 to	 be	 about	presences?	If	absences	in	general	and	omissions	in	particular	are	non-existents,	as	Schaffer	 concedes	 they	 are,	 how	 can	 singular	 terms	 like	 “the	 absence	 of	 blood	 in	Charles’s	brain”	and	“the	gardener’s	omission”	refer	to	existents	in	(possibly)	true	causal	absence	sentences?	And	 to	which	existents	do	 they	refer?	To	answer	 these	questions	we	need	an	account	of	the	truth-conditions	of	causal	absence	sentences.	Following	Schaffer,	I	will	concentrate	on	causal	omission	reports.	My	paradigm	sen-tence	will	be	“The	gardener’s	omission	to	water	my	flowers	caused	them	to	wilt”.	How	are	the	truth-conditions	of	causal	omission	sentences	determined?	Let’s	take	a	look	at	their	formational	history.	On	way	to	look	at	causal	omission	sentences	is	to	regard	them	as	the	final	product	of	three	consecutive	semantic	operations:	ne-gation,	 nominalization,	 and	predication.	 Take,	 for	 example,	 “The	 gardener’s	 omis-sion	 to	water	my	 flowers	caused	 them	to	wilt”.	At	 the	 linguistic	 level,	 the	starting	point	of	this	semantic	construction	is	the	positive	“commission”	sentence		(1)		 	 The	gardener	watered	my	flowers.	Moore	suggests,	and	Schaffer	accepts,	that	(1)	expresses	an	existential	claim:		(1’)	 There	 was	 an	 event,	 which	 was	 a	 watering	 by	 the	 gardener	 of	 my	flowers.7	According	to	Schaffer,	sentence	(1’)	“serves	to	denote	an	event“:	a	watering	action	with	 the	gardener	as	agent	and	my	 flowers	as	patient	 (see	4.1).	He	also	says	 that																																																																																																																																																																					ary	sense	to	the	sentences	that	express	them.	Note	that	Schaffer	applies	the	term	“omission	claim”	to	sentences	and	to	a	special	type	of	singular	terms,	viz.	nominalized	sentences.	For	example,	he	says	that,	 for	 Moore,	 “omission	 claims	 such	 as	 ‘James’s	 omission	 to	 kill	 Smith’,	 ‘James’s	 failing	 to	 kill	Smith’,	and	‘the	absence	of	James’s	killing	Smith’	come	out	as:	NOT	( e)	(Killing(e)	&	Agent(e)=James	&	Patient(e)=Smith)”	(4.2)	Here	the	first	three	singular	terms	are	said	to	have	–	per	imposibile	–	the	meaning	of	a	sentence.	This	 indiscriminate	practice	supports	 the	current	widespread	and	unfortu-nate	 tendency	 to	 blur	 the	 categorical	 distinction	 between	 sentences	 and	 singular	 terms,	which	 in	turn	leads	to	confusion	about	the	idea	of	reference	denotation.	See	my	second	objection	in	§9.	7	In	the	language	of	the	predicate	calculus:	“(∃e)	(Watering(e)	&	Agent(e)=the	gardener	&	Patient(e)-=my	flowers)”,	where	“e”	ranges	over	events.	Cp.	Schaffer’s	analysis	in	4.1	of	“James	killed	Smith”.		
		
8	
such	sentences	“denote	existential	quantifications	over	events”.	It	is	not	clear	what	either	of	these	formulations	mean.	True,	(1’)	quantifies	over	events,	but	what	does	it	mean	to	say	that	it	denotes	“existential	quantifications	over	events”?	A	better	for-mulation	is	perhaps	that		(1’)	says	of	a	certain	type	of	event	that	it	has	at	least	one	instance	(cp.	Moore’s	paraphrase	in	the	quote	below).	Or,	alternatively,	(1’)	may	be	said	to	claim	that	the	property	of	being-a-watering-of-my-flowers-by-the-gardener	is	exemplified.	Or,	less	contrived,	that	there	was	an	event	of	watering	of	my	flowers	by	 the	 gardener.	 Thus,	 (1’)	may	 be	 said	 to	 assert	 of	 an	 event-type	 that	 it	 has	 in-stances	(tokens),	or	of	property	that	it	is	exemplified,	or	of	a	class	that	it	has	mem-bers.		 If	(1’)	merely	makes	explicit	the	logical	form	of	(1),	then	(1)	and	(1’)	express	the	same	proposition	and	have	the	same	truth-conditions.	We	can	therefore	speak	of	the	proposition	or	the	claim	expressed	by	both	(1)-sentences.	Since	the	claim	ex-pressed	 by	 (1)-sentences	 forms	 the	 basis	 and	 starting	 point	 of	 the	 semantic	 con-struction	of	causal	omission	claims,	I	refer	to	it	as	“the	basic	commission	claim”,	and	to	the	sentences	with	that	content	as	“basic	commission	sentences”.		The	negation	and	contradictory	of	the	basic	commission	claim	expressed	in	(1)-sentences	is	that	it	is	not	the	case	that	the	gardener	watered	my	flowers.	Ordi-nary	 English	 allows	 a	 variety	 of	 ways	 and	 styles	 to	 express	 this	 omission	 claim.	Moore	mentions	three:		“There	 are	 negative	 propositions	 about	 events,	 such	 as	 ‘The	 gardener	 omitted	 to	water	my	flowers’	meaning	 ‘It	 is	not	 the	case	that	 the	gardener	watered	my	flow-ers’.	Such	negative	statements	are	negative	existentially	quantified	ones:	if	there	is	an	 omission	 to	water	my	 flowers,	 then	what	 is	 true	 is	 that	 it	 is	 not	 the	 case	 that	some	instance	of	the	type	of	event,	watering	my	flowers,	existed.”8	Since	 all	 of	 these	 three	 formulations	 negate	 and	 contradict	 the	 content	 of	 (1)-sentences,	I	refer	to	them	as	“(Neg_1)-sentences”.	(Neg_1)-sentences	deny	what	(1)-sentences	affirm.	(Neg_1)-sentences	say	that	the	gardener	omitted	to	do	–	did	not	do	–	what	(1)-sentences	claim	he	did.	Generalizing,	we	can	say	that	omissions	are	non-commissions.	The	omission	claim	that	a	omitted	to	ø	denies	what	the	commis-sion	claim	that	a	ø-ed	affirms.	They	are	each	other’s	negations	and	contradictories.	The	negation	 of	 a	 commission	 claim	 is	 an	 omission	 claim,	 and	 vice	 versa.	 Talk	 of	“omissions”	derives	 its	 sense	and	point	 from	 the	contrast	with	 the	 corresponding																																																									8	Moore	2009,	53;	quoted	by	Schaffer	in	4.1.	–	I	have	taken	the	liberty	to	replace	Moore’s	(and	Schaf-fer’s)	example	sentence	“James	omitted	to	kill	Smith”	with	mine,	and	I	do	so	throughout	this	paper.	
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commissions.	Since	“omitted”	means	“did	not”,	we	can	safely	add	“The	gardener	did	not	water	my	flowers”	to	Moore’s	trio	of	(Neg_1)-sentences.	Moore’s	thesis	is	then	that	these	four	sentences	express	the	same	omission	claim	in	different	ways:		
• The	gardener	omitted	to	water	my	flowers.	
• The	gardener	did	not	water	my	flowers.	
• It	is	not	the	case	that	the	gardener	watered	my	flowers.	
• It	 is	not	 the	case	 that	 there	was	an	event,	which	was	a	watering	by	 the	gardener	of	my	flowers.9	For	now,	we	can	confine	our	attention	to	the	first	and	the	last	entry	on	Moore’s	list:	(Neg_1)	 The	gardener	omitted	to	water	my	flowers.	(Neg_1’)	 It	is	not	the	case	that	there	was	an	event,	which	was	a	watering	by	the	gardener	of	my	flowers.	The	second	step	in	the	semantic	construction	of	the	causal	absence	claim	“The	gar-dener’s	omission	 to	water	my	 flowers	caused	 them	to	wilt”	 is	nominalization.	We	can	nominalize	the	two	(Neg_1)-sentences	by	means	of	“that”	to	form	the	semanti-cally	equivalent	singular	terms:10		(NomNeg_1)	 	 That	the	gardener	omitted	to	water	my	flowers	(NomNeg_1’)	 	That	it	is	not	the	case	that	there	was	an	event,	which	was	a	wa-tering	by	the	gardener	of	my	flowers	In	 the	 third	 and	 last	 constructional	 step,	we	 combine	 these	 (NomNeg_1)-singular	terms	with	 the	predicate	 “…	 caused	my	 flowers	 to	wilt”.	This	 gives	us	 two	 causal	omission	sentences	that	express	the	same	causal	omission	claim:	(CauseNeg_1)		 That	the	gardener	omitted	to	water	my	flowers	caused	them	to	wilt.11	(CauseNeg_1’)	 	That	it	is	not	the	case	that	there	was	an	event,	which	was	a	wa-tering	by	the	gardener	of	my	flowers	caused	them	to	wilt.	If	 this	 example	 can	 be	 generalized,	 this	 account	 appears	 to	 be	 a	 plausible	 recon-struction	of	the	formational	history	of	causal	admission	claims.	In	any	case,	I	think	it																																																									9	I	assume	here	that	this	formulation	–	I	call	it	“Neg_1’”	–	captures	in	a	somewhat	more	natural	way	what	Moore	means	by	“It	is	not	the	case	that	some	instance	of	the	type	of	event,	watering	my	flow-ers,	existed”	in	the	passage	quoted	above.	For,	to	deny	that	the	type	identified	by	the	indefinite	de-scription	“event,	which	is	a	watering	of	my	flowers	(by	the	gardener)”	is	instantiated	is	to	deny	that	something	falls	under	the	concept	of	being	an	event	of	watering	of	my	flowers	by	the	gardener.	10	Again,	ordinary	English	offers	several	semantically	equivalent	ways	of	nominalizing	a	sentence.	A	popular	alternative	to	the	use	of	“that”	are	gerundive	constructions	such	as	“the	gardener’s	not	wa-tering	 my	 flowers”.	 However,	 that-nominalizations	 are	 logically	 more	 transparent	 and	 therefore	preferable	for	the	purpose	of	semantic	analysis.	11	I	assume	here	that	“The	gardener’s	omission	to	water	my	flowers	caused	them	to	wilt”	is	just	an-other,	more	compressed	way	of	expressing	the	same	claim.	It	is	another	(CauseNeg_1)	sentence.	
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is	a	plausible	 interpretation	of	what	Moore	has	mind,	 so	 I	will	 call	 it	 “Moore’s	ac-count.”		
7.	Schaffer’s	“pluralistic	idea”	According	to	Schaffer,	Moore’s	account	is	fine	as	far	as	it	goes.	But	Schaffer	believes	that	Moore	overlooks	a	crucial	ambiguity	of	meaning	that	affects	all	three	construc-tional	stages.	We	have	seen	that	Schaffer	accepts	Moore’s	proposal	that	(1)	is	to	be	analyzed	 as	 (1’),	 and	 that	 both	 sentences	 are	 therefore	 synonymous.	 However,	Schaffer	 argues	 that	 their	 respective	 negations	 (Neg_1)	 and	 (Neg_1’)	 cannot	 have	the	 same	meaning	and	 truth-conditions,	 since	 (Neg_1)	 is	multiply	ambiguous	 in	a	way	 that	 (Neg_1’)	 is	not.	 Since	 ambiguity	 is	 contagious,	 the	 same	must	be	 true	of	(NomNeg_1)	and	(NomNeg_1’)	as	well	as	of	(CauseNeg_1)	and	(CauseNeg_1’).		According	to	Schaffer,	this	semantic	ambiguity	is	introduced	by	the	first	step	of	negating	a	commission	claim.	We	have	seen	that	Moore	offers	his	readers	four	al-legedly	equivalent	ways	of	expressing	omission	claims	in	ordinary	and	not	so	ordi-nary	English:		
• The	gardener	omitted	to	water	my	flowers.		 	 =	(Neg_1)	
• The	gardener	did	not	water	my	flowers.		
• It	is	not	the	case	that	the	gardener	watered	my	flowers.	
• It	is	not	the	case	that	there	was	an	event,	which	was	a	watering	by	the	gar-dener	of	my	flowers		 	 	 	 	 =	(Neg_1’)	Schaffer	draws	our	attention	to	what	at	 first	sight	appears	to	be	a	merely	stylistic	difference	between	the	first	and	the	second	pair	on	Moore’s	 list:	The	first	pair	ne-gates	 by	 using	 the	 adverbial	 negator	 “not”,12	 the	 second	 employs	 the	 sentential13	negator	“it	is	not	the	case	that	…”.	According	to	Schaffer,	Moore	is	wrong	to	suggest	that	 this	difference	 is	merely	stylistic	and	has	no	semantic	 import.	He	argues	 that	the	adverbial	negator	“not”	infuses	the	first	pair	of	sentences	with	a	scope	ambigui-ty	 that	makes	 them	multiply	ambiguous	 in	a	way	 the	second	pair,	which	uses	 the																																																									12	I	assume	here	that	“omitted”	just	means	“did	not”	so	that	the	sense	of	“not”	is	part	of	the	sense	of	the	first	sentence	even	though	the	word	is	not.	13	“It	is	not	the	case	that	…”	is	a	sentential	operator	because	it	generates	sentences	as	values	for	sen-tences	as	arguments.	What	 the	sentential	negator	negates	–	 the	object	of	negation	–	 is	always	and	exclusively	 the	 complete	 sentence	 that	 follows	 it,	 or	more	 precisely,	 the	 complete	 proposition	 ex-pressed	by	that	sentence.	
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sentential	negator	“it	is	not	the	case	that	…”,	is	not.	Adverbial	negations	with	“not”	are	said	to	be	indeterminate	and	ambiguous	in	scope	since	they	allow	for	“widest”	
as	 well	 as	 for	 “narrower”	 scope	 interpretations.	 In	 contrast,	 sentential	 negations	with	“it	is	not	the	case	that	…”	are	unambiguous	and	determinate	since	they	are	ex-
clusively	of	widest	scope.	Thus,	 in	 its	widest	scope	meaning,	 the	adverbial	negator	“not”	is	semantically	equivalent	to	the	sentential	negator	“it	is	not	the	case	that	…”.	In	the	widest	scope	reading	of	“not”,	the	omission	sentence	“The	gardener	omitted	to	(did	not)	water	my	flowers”	says	that	it	is	not	the	case	that	the	gardener	watered	my	flowers.	Thus,	when	“not”	is	read	as	having	widest	scope,	the	first	two	sentences	on	Moore’s	list	express	the	same	omission	claim	as	the	members	of	the	second	pair.	However,	unlike	its	sentential	counterpart,	the	adverbial	“not”	can	also	have	a	nar-rower	scope.	On	any	narrower	scope	reading	what	is	being	negated	is	not	what	the	basic	commission	sentence	“The	gardener	watered	my	flowers”	affirms	but	some-thing	else.	Due	to	their	scope	ambiguity,	omission	sentences	such	as	“The	gardener	omitted	to	(did	not)	water	my	flowers”	express	additional,	very	different	omission	claims	–	or	so	Schaffer	wants	us	to	believe:	“So	I	am	advocating	that	omission	claims	can	 only	 have	 wide	 scope	 negation,	 the	 pluralistic	 idea	 that	 omission	 claims	 can	have	multiple	interpretations	with	negations	of	various	scopes,	including	both	wide	and	narrower	scope	readings	(4.2).		 Some	clarifications	of	Schaffer’s	pluralistic	idea	are	in	order.		That	“omission	claims	can	have	multiple	interpretations	with	negations	of	various	scopes,	including	both	wide	and	narrower	scope	readings”	can	only	mean	that	certain	sentences	that	purport	to	be	about	omissions	of	the	form	“a	omitted	to	(did	not)	φ”	allow	for	mul-tiple	 interpretations	 relative	 to	 the	 scope	 assigned	 to	 “not”.	 It	 cannot	 mean	 that	there	are	multiple	negations	of	the	same	omission	claim,	or	that	there	is	more	than	one	way	to	negate	the	same	commission	claim.	There	is	no	such	thing	as	widest	and	narrower	scope	negations	of	the	same	proposition.	As	mentioned	in	§3,	modern	log-ic	conceives	of	negation	as	truth-functional	and	thus	always	and	exclusively	of	wid-est,	i.	e.	sentential,	or	more	precisely,	propositional	scope.	It	follows	that,	in	the	last	analysis,	all	negations	can	be	expressed	with	the	widest	scope	sentential	negator	“it	is	not	 the	 case	 that	…”.	Talk	of	different	 types	of	negation	–	 “widest	vs.	narrower	scope”	–	of	 the	same	sentence	 is	a	 just	a	(potentially	misleading)	way	of	speaking	about	the	–	one	and	only,	always	widest	scope	–	negation	of	different	propositions	
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expressed	 by	 that	 sentence.	 Applied	 to	 our	 example,	 Schaffer	 agrees	with	Moore	that	all	four	sentences	on	Moore’s	list	express	the	–	one	and	only!	–	negation	and	the	–	one	and	only!	–	contradictory	of	the	basic	commission	claim	(1).	However,	against	Moore’s	monistic	 idea	that	all	 four	sentences	are	merely	stylistic	variations	of	one	and	the	same	omission	claim,	Schaffer	advocates	the	“pluralistic	idea”	that	the	first	pair	on	Moore’s	list	is	multiply	ambiguous	and	expresses	other	negations	and	con-tradictories	of	 commission	 claims	different	 from	 (1)	 as	well.	Thus,	 “The	gardener	omitted	 to	water	my	 flowers”	 and	 “The	 gardener	 did	 not	 water	my	 flowers”	 are	both	 (Neg_1)-sentence	 like	 the	 other	 sentences	 on	Moore’s	 list.14	 But,	 unlike	 the	sentences	that	comprise	the	second	pair,	they	are	not	only	(Neg_1)-sentences.	What	are	these	additional,	very	different	omission	claims	that	Schaffer	alleg-es	 are	 expressed	 by	 “The	 gardener	 omitted	 to	 (did	 not)	water	my	 flowers”	 apart	and	beyond	 the	negation	and	contradictory	of	 (1)?	One	of	 those	so-called	narrow	scope	negations	explicitly	mentioned	by	Schaffer	is	(Truism)	 There	was	an	event,	which	was	not	a	watering	by	the	gardener	of	my	flowers.15	This	expresses	the	boring	truth	(Schaffer	rightly	calls	it	a	“truism”)	that	there	was	an	event	in	the	history	of	the	universe	that	fits	the	negative	description	of	not	being	a	watering	by	the	gardener	of	my	flowers.	According	to	Schaffer,	(Truism)	express-es	an	omission	claim,	and	omission	claims	are	non-commission	claims.16	What	is	the	corresponding	commission	claim,	i.	e.	the	negation	and	contradictory	of	(Truism)?	Clearly	not	the	content	of	(1),	since	(Truism)	and	(1)	may	both	be	true.	 It	may	be	that	the	gardener	watered	my	flowers	and	that	this	was	not	all	that	ever	happened	in	the	history	of	the	universe.	(Truism)	is	not	the	negation	and	logical	contradictory	of	(1),	but	of	(Hopeless)	 It	 is	not	the	case	that	there	was	an	event	that	was	not	a	watering	by	the	gardener	of	my	flowers.																																																									14	In	the	rest	of	this	paper,	I	will	for	reasons	of	convenience	condense	both	of	this	pair	of	sentences	into	one:	“The	gardener	omitted	to	(did	not)	water	my	flowers.”	15	Cp.	Schaffer’s	analogous	narrower	scope	negation	of	“James	killed	Smith”	as	“(∃e)	NOT	(Killing(e)	&	 Agent(e)=James	 &	 Patient(e)=Smith)”	 which	 he	 paraphrases	 as	 “There	 is	 an	 event	 (a	 positive	presence)	which	is	not	a	killing	of	Smith	by	James“	in	4.2.	16	 It	 is	Schaffer,	not	me,	who	calls	these	alleged	alternative	meanings	of	omission	sentences	“omis-sion	 claims”	 and	 is	 therefore	 committed	 to	 view	 their	 respective	negations	 and	 contradictories	 as	commission	claims	in	my	sense.	I	found	it	difficult	to	see	in	what	sense	this	terminology	is	applicable,	for	example,	to	(Truism)	and	(Hopeless)	and	to	(OtherDoings)	and	(OnlyWaterings).	Is	this	merely	a	terminological	oddity?	
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This	expresses	the	(hopeless)	claim	that	all	that	ever	happened	were	waterings	of	my	flowers	by	the	gardener.	A	second	so-called	narrow	scope	negation	mentioned	by	Schaffer	and	also	allegedly	expressed	by	“The	gardener	omitted	to	(did	not)	wa-ter	my	flowers”	is		(OtherDoings)	 	There	 was	 something	 done	 by	 the	 gardener	 to	 my	 flowers	which	was	not	a	watering.17	(OtherDoings)	would	be	true,	for	example,	if	the	gardener	had	done	other	things	to	my	 flowers,	 for	 example,	 if	 he	 had	 smelled,	 pruned	 or	 talked	 to	 them.	 Again,	(OtherDoings)	does	not	deny	what	(1)	affirms,	since	they	are	compatible:	The	gar-dener	may	have	watered	my	flowers,	but	that	may	not	be	all	he	ever	did	to	them.	Rather,	(OtherDoings)	denies	the	claim	that	all	the	gardener	ever	did	to	my	flowers	was	watering	them:	(OnlyWaterings)	 There	was	nothing	done	by	the	gardener	to	my	flowers	which	was	not	a	watering.	We	 can	 summarize	 Schaffer’s	 positions	 as	 follows.	Omission	 sentences	with	 “not”	suffer	from	a	“familiar	scope	ambiguity	of	ordinary	language”	(4.2).	They	express	as	many	different	propositions	as	there	are	grammatically	possible	scope	variations	of	“not”.	 If	“not”	 is	understood	as	having	widest	scope,	an	omission	sentence	such	as	“The	gardener	omitted	to	(did	not)	water	my	flowers”	says	the	same	as	(Neg_1).	We	can	 state	 its	 truth-conditions	 on	 its	 (Neg_1)-meaning	 as	 follows:	 “The	 gardener	omitted	to	(did	not)	water	may	flowers”	is	true	iff	it	is	not	the	case	that	the	gardener	watered	my	flowers.	However,	“not”	may	also	have	a	narrower	scope.	If	it	express-es,	 for	 example,	 (Truism)	 its	 truth-conditions	 are:	 “The	 gardener	 omitted	 to	 (did	not)	water	may	flowers”	is	true	iff	it	is	not	the	case	that	all	that	ever	happened	were	waterings	of	my	flowers	by	the	gardener.	Another	possible	narrower	scope	mean-ing	of	our	omission	sentence	is	(OtherDoings):	“The	gardener	omitted	to	(did	not)	water	may	flowers”	is	true	iff	it	is	not	the	case	that	all	the	gardener	ever	did	to	my	flowers	was	watering	them.		
																																																								17	Again,	cp.	Schaffer’s	analogous	narrower	scope	analysis	of	“James	killed	Smith”	as	“(∃e)	(NOT	Kill-ing(e)	&	Agent(e)=James	&	Patient(e)=Smith)”	which	he	paraphrases	as	“There	is	something	done	by	James	to	Smith	which	is	not	a	killing”	in	4.2.	
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8.	The	significance	of	narrower	scope	meanings:	reference	For	 Schaffer,	 the	 salient	 and	 all-important	 difference	 between	 the	 widest	 scope	meaning	 (Neg_1’)	 and	narrower	 scope	meanings	 such	 as	 (Truism)	 and	 (OtherDo-ings)	 is	 that	 (Neg_1’)	 denies	 the	 existence	 of	 something,	 whereas	 (Truism)	 and	(OtherDoings)	affirm	the	existence	of	something	merely	negatively	described.	Wid-est	scope	meanings	are	of	the	form	“Nothing	is	F”,	whereas	narrower	scope	mean-ings	are	of	the	form	“Something	is	not	F”.	Narrower	scope	meanings	such	as	(Tru-ism)	 and	 (OtherDoings),	 Schaffer	 says,	 “denote”	 or	 describe	 a	 different	 “positive	presence”,	or	a	different	“positive	event”	in	negative	terms:	“On	all	of	the	options	other	than	the	one	where	the	negation	takes	widest	scope,	the	absence	claim	 is	denoting	a	positive	presence,	but	describing	 it	negatively.	 For	 in-stance,	 the	 last	example	above	[=	(OtherDoings)]	describes	a	positive	event	of	 the	gardener	doing	 something	other	 than	a	watering	of	my	 flowers	 […].	Absence	 talk	can	be	a	way	to	describe	something”	(4.2).	Hence,	there	is	absence	talk	of	the	logical	form	“Nothing	is	F”	about	nothing	(i.	e.	an	“absence”),	and	there	is	absence	talk	of	the	form	“Something	is	not	F”	about	some-thing	merely	negatively	described.	Moore’s	widest	scope	meaning	(Neg_1’)	is	of	the	first	 type,	Schaffer’s	narrower	scope	meanings	 (Truism)	and	(OtherDoings)	of	 the	second,	and	can	therefore	be	said	to	denote,	describe	or	refer	to	something	existent.		Let’s	assume	that	(Truism)	and	(OtherDoings)	are	about	something	and	refer	to	or	denote	a	“positive	presence”,	a	“positive	event”.	What	is	the	significance	of	all	this	 for	 the	 problem	of	 absence	 causation?	 It	 is	 this:	 If	 narrower	 scope	meanings	such	as	(Truism)	and	(OtherDoings)	refer	 to	a	positive	presence	 instead	of	an	ab-sence,	 to	something	 instead	of	nothing,	 they	can	be	used	as	building	blocks	 in	 the	semantic	construction	of	possibly	true	causal	omission	claims.	In	effect,	Schaffer	ar-gues	that,	if	(Truism)	and	(OtherDoings)	refer,	so	do	the	singular	terms	formed	by	“that”-nominalization:	(NomTruism)	 That	there	was	an	event,	which	was	not	a	watering	by	the	gar-dener	of	my	flowers	(NomOtherDoings)	 That	there	was	something	done	by	the	gardener	to	my	flowers	which	was	not	a	watering	If	 this	 is	correct,	each	of	 the	 two	singular	 terms	(NomTruism)	and	(NomOtherDo-ings)	refers	to	a	positive	event,	which	may	play	the	role	of	a	cause.	Since	(NomTru-ism)	and	(NomOtherDoings)	form	the	respective	subject	terms	of	the	causal	omis-sion	claims	
		
15	
(CauseTruism)		 That	 there	was	an	event,	which	was	not	a	watering	by	the	gardener	of	my	flowers	caused	them	to	wilt.	(CauseOtherDoings)	 That	 there	was	something	done	by	the	gardener	to	my	flowers	which	was	not	a	watering	caused	them	to	wilt.	formed	by	applying	 the	predicate	 “…	caused	my	 flowers	 to	wilt”	 in	 the	 third	 con-structional	step,	they	too	may	be	said	to	be	about	this	event	and	possible	cause.	If	so,	(CauseTruism)	and	(CauseOtherDoings)	are	causal	omission	claims	that	meet	all	existential	presuppositions	for	having	a	truth-value.			 Generalizing,	Schaffer	concludes	that	there	may	be	true	causal	omission	sen-tences	despite	the	fact	that	omissions	(and	absences	in	general)	are	causally	impo-tent.	What	makes	this	possible	is	the	fact	that	omission	claims	(and	absence	claims	generally)	can	be	understood	as	being	about	something:	“Absence	talk	can	be	a	way	to	describe	something”	(4.2).	Thus,	in	order	to	reconcile	No	Absences	with	Possible	
Truth,	we	merely	have	 to	 assume	 that	 the	 subject	 terms	of	 (possibly)	 true	 causal	absence	claims	have	been	formed	from	omission	claims	with	a	narrower	than	wid-est	scope	negation:	“When	I	truly	claim	that	the	gardener’s	failing	to	water	my	flow-ers	caused	them	to	wilt,	I	need	only	be	read	as	describing	the	cause	with	the	nega-tion	taking	some	narrower	scope,	to	be	speaking	of	something”	(4.2).			
9.	Three	objections	There	are	at	least	three	objections	to	Schaffer’s	solution.	The	first	concerns	his	the-sis	that	omission	sentences	that	use	the	adverbial	“not”	such	as	“The	gardener	omit-ted	 to	(did	not)	water	my	 flowers”	are	scope	ambiguous,	and	express	a	variety	of	different	omission	claims.	Against	this,	I	will	argue	that	there	is	no	such	scope	am-biguity,	that	Schaffer	gives	us	no	convincing	argument	to	think	otherwise,	and	that	his	semantics	for	omission	sentences	has	unacceptable	consequences.		We	have	seen	that	Schaffer’s	account	is	crucially	premised	on	the	existence	of	an	alleged	scope	ambiguity	of	“not”.	What	grounds	are	there	for	believing	in	this	scope	ambiguity?	This	is	Schaffer’s	argument:	“There	are	many	places	[in	“(∃e)	(Watering(e)	&	Agent(e)=the	gardener	&	Patient-(e)=my	flowers)”]	where	one	could	insert	a	negation.	There	is	the	option	of	giving	the	negation	widest	scope	….	But	there	are	a	range	of	alternatives	in	which	the	ne-gation	has	narrower	scope	[…]	So	I	am	advocating,	as	against	the	idea	…	that	omis-sion	 claims	 can	 only	 have	wide	 scope	 negation,	 the	pluralistic	 idea	 that	 omission	
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claims	can	have	multiple	interpretations	with	negations	of	various	scopes,	including	both	wide	and	narrower	scope	readings”	(4.2;	Schaffer’s	italics).	In	this	passage,	Schaffer	draws	the	semantic	conclusion	that	omission	claims	have	multiple	interpretations	from	the	grammatical	premise	that	certain	formulations	of	commission	 claims	allow	 for	more	 than	one	place	 to	 “insert	 a	negation”	 that.	Ap-plied	to	our	example	about	the	gardener,	his	argument	is:	P1:	The	 commission	 sentence	 (1)	 “The	gardener	watered	my	 flowers”	means	 (1’)	“There	was	an	event,	which	was	a	watering	by	the	gardener	of	my	flowers”.	P2:	 Grammar	 permits	 the	 generation	 of	many	meaningful	 sentences	 by	 inserting	“not”	in	different	places	in	(1’),	among	them	(Neg_1’),	(Truism),	and	(OtherDoings).	Therefore,	C:	The	omission	sentence	“The	gardener	omitted	to	(did	not)	water	my	flowers”	 is	multiply	 ambiguous	 and	expresses	 the	meanings	of	 all	 the	meaningful	sentences	thus	generable	from	(1’),	among	them	(Neg_1’),	(Truism),	and	(OtherDo-ings).	If	this	is	Schaffer’s	argument,	it	is	a	non	sequitur.	P1	and	P2	do	not	imply	C.	It	is	true	that	the	rules	of	grammar	allow	for	more	than	one	meaningful	place	to	“insert	a	ne-gation”	 into	 “(∃e)	 (Watering(e)	 &	 Agent(e)=the	 gardener	 &	 Patient(e)=my	 flow-ers)”,	vulgo	(1’)	 There	 was	 an	 event,	 which	 was	 a	 watering	 by	 the	 gardener	 of	 my	flowers.	It	is	also	true	that,	if	we	allow	a	bit	of	reshuffling,	the	results	of	these	grammatically	correct,	 and	 thus	meaningful	 “insertions”	 include	not	only	 the	widest	 scope	nega-tions		(Neg_1’)	 	It	is	not	the	case	that	there	was	an	event,	which	was	a	watering	by	the	gardener	of	my	flowers.	but	also	so-called	narrow	scope	negations	such	as	(Truism)	 	There	was	at	least	one	event,	which	was	not	a	watering	by	the	gardener	of	my	flowers.	(OtherDoings)	 There	 was	 something	 done	 by	 the	 gardener	 to	 my	 flowers,	which	was	not	a	watering.	And	yes,	all	of	these	sentences	may	be	said	to	be	“perfectly	legitimate	semantic	val-ues”	in	the	sense	that	they	are	grammatically	legitimate.	That	is,	(Neg_1’),	(Truism),	and	(OtherDoings)	have	been	formed	in	accordance	with	the	rules	of	grammar.		However,	this	grammatical	fact	goes	no	distance	in	establishing	the	semantic	conclusion	 that	 the	 omission	 claim	 “The	 gardener	 omitted	 to	 (did	 not)	water	my	
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flowers”	expresses	the	meanings	of	all	grammatically	correct	sentences	thus	gram-matically	generable,	and	that	the	resulting	multiple	ambiguity	 is	“is	 just	a	 familiar	scope	 ambiguity	 in	 ordinary	 language.”	Moreover,	 Schaffer’s	 claim	 that	 the	 “wide	scope	and	the	various	narrower	scope	readings	are	all	perfectly	legitimate	semantic	
values,	which	a	speaker	might	intend	to	express”,	for	example,	by	uttering	“The	gar-dener	omitted	to	(did	not)	water	my	flowers”	taxes	credulity.	The	consequences	are	simply	too	bizarre.		First	of	all,	 it	 is	hard	to	swallow	that	“The	gardener	did	not	water	my	flow-ers”	 is	multiply	 ambiguous	 and	 therefore	different	 in	meaning	 from	 “It	 is	 not	 the	case	that	the	gardener	watered	my	flowers”.	But	according	to	Schaffer,	the	last	for-mulation	captures	only	the	(Neg_1)-meaning	of	that	sentence,	and	a	speaker	might	also	 intend	 (Truism)	 or	 (OtherDoings).	 Even	 then	 we	 should	 keep	 in	 mind	 that	there	is	a	striking	asymmetry	between	the	widest	scope	meanings	on	the	one	hand	and	 multiple	 narrower	 scope	 meanings	 on	 the	 other.	 Only	 the	 widest	 scope	(Neg_1)-meaning	expresses	the	negation	and	the	contradictory	of	the	content	of	(1).	On	any	of	its	narrower	scope	meanings,	someone	could	utter	“The	gardener	omitted	to	 (did	not)	water	my	 flowers”,	 and	consistently	add:	 “…	and	he	diligently	waters	my	 flowers	 all	 the	 time”.	 As	 if	 this	were	 not	 odd	 enough,	 a	 speaker	who	 intends	(Truism),	could	meaningfully	and	 truthfully	back	his	claim	by	adding,	 “…	after	all,	there	is	the	sinking	of	the	Titanic”;	and	if	he	intended	(OtherDoings),	he	would	be	able	to	support	what	he	says	by	“…	because	he	talks	to	them	every	day	for	hours”.	The	speaker	may	also	consistently	and	perhaps	truly	express	the	complex	thought	that	 there	 are	 events	 other	 than	waterings	 of	 my	 flowers,	 but	 that	 the	 gardener	never	did	anything	else	to	them,	by	uttering,	with	a	quick	switch	of	intentions	in	the	right	place:	“The	gardener	omitted	to	(did	not)	water	my	flowers,	and	it	is	not	the	case	 that	 the	 gardener	 omitted	 to	 (did	 not)	 water	 my	 flowers.”	 All	 this	 seems	strange,	if	not	bizarre,	and	amounts	in	my	view	to	a	reductio	of	Schaffer’s	omission	semantics.	 “The	gardener	omitted	to	(did	not)	water	my	flowers”	simply	does	not	have	these	narrower	scope	meanings,	and	a	speaker	therefore	cannot	express	them,	even	if	he	intends	to	do	so.18																																																									18	I	assume	here	that	it	is	impossible	for	an	individual	speaker	to	make	a	phrase	mean	something	it	doesn’t	mean.	That	is,	I	side	with	Alice	against	Humpty-Dumpty:		Humpty-Dumpty:	“…	There’s	glory	for	you!”	“I	don’t	know	what	you	mean	by	‘glory’,”	Alice	said.	
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	 However,	 let’s	assume	arguendo	that	omission	sentences	formed	with	“not”	are	 multiply	 ambiguous	 in	 the	 way	 Schaffer	 says	 they	 are.	 Would	 this	 solve	 the	problem	of	absence	causation	along	the	lines	Schaffer	envisages?	My	second	objec-tion	is	that	it	would	not.	As	we	saw	in	§8,	the	salient	difference	Schaffer	tries	to	ex-ploit	between	widest	and	the	narrower	scope	meanings	is	one	of	reference	or	deno-tation.	It	is	that	the	former	are	allegedly	event-quantifications	of	the	non-referential	type	“Nothing	is	F”	whereas	the	latter	are	of	the	referential	type	“Something	is	not	F”.	This	difference	in	terms	of	denotation	or	reference	is	what	Schaffer’s	is	really	af-ter	and	what	gives	his	distinction	between	wide	scope	and	narrower	scope	meaning	its	philosophical	point.	However,	is	there	such	difference	of	reference	or	denotation	between	widest	and	narrower	scope	meanings?	We	should	be	wary	of	the	general	idea	of	sentences	as	having	reference,	or	as	“denoting”	something.	The	main	point	of	(assertoric)	sen-tences	in	normal	use	is	to	assert,	not	to	denote	or	to	refer.19	The	notion	of	reference	is	clearest	with	respect	to	singular	terms.	It	is	harmless	to	say	that	a	sentence	“a	is	F”	is	about	(denotes,	refers	to)	whatever	its	subject	term	“a”	is	about	(denotes,	re-fers	to).	The	subject	term	is	naturally	understood	as	giving	us	the	subject	of	asser-toric	discourse,	i.	e.	what	we	talk	about.	Here,	talk	of	sentence	reference	is	deriva-tive	from,	and	parasitic	on,	singular	term	reference.	But	it	is	not	always	possible	to	reduce	talk	of	sentence	reference	to	talk	of	singular	term	reference,	and	any	analog-ical	extension	from	the	reference	of	singular	terms	to	other	logical	categories,	be	it	predicates	or	sentences,	has	to	make	the	point	and	rationale	of	the	analogy	clear.	In	particular,	it	is	a	mistake	to	think	that,	since	it	is	harmless	and	true	to	say	that	sen-tences	of	the	form	“a	is	F”	are	about	the	individual	a,	it	must	also	be	harmless	and	true	to	say	that	sentences	of	the	form	“Something	is	F”	are	about	something.	“Some-thing”	is	not	a	singular	term,	but	a	(second-order)	predicate,	a	quantifier.	If	it	can	be	said	to	refer	at	all,	its	mode	of	reference	is	not	that	of	a	singular	term.																																																																																																																																																																						Humpty	Dumpty	smiled	contemptuously.	“Of	course	you	don’t	—	till	I	tell	you.	I	meant	‘there’s	a	nice	knock-down	argument	for	you!”	“But	‘glory’	doesn’t	mean	‘a	nice	knock-down	argument’,”	Alice	objected.	“When	I	use	a	word,”	Humpty	Dumpty	said,	in	rather	a	scornful	tone,	“it	means	just	what	I	choose	it	to	mean	—	neither	more	nor	less.”	“The	question	is,”	said	Alice,	“whether	you	can	make	words	mean	so	many	different	things.”	“The	question	is,”	said	Humpty	Dumpty,	“which	is	to	be	master	—	that’s	all.”		19	 In	many	 current	 discussions	 the	 idea	 of	 sentence	 reference	 is	 taken	 for	 granted,	which	 in	 turn	supports	a	questionable	tendency	to	assimilate	sentences	to	singular	terms.	This	tendency	is	also	ev-ident	in	Schaffer’s	text;	see	footnote	5	above.	
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The	 basic	 commission	 sentence	 (1)	 “The	 gardener	watered	my	 flowers”	 is	reasonable	taken	to	be	about	the	gardener	and	/	or	about	my	flowers.	And	this	re-mains	true	even	if	(1)	is	analyzed	as	meaning	(1’)	“There	was	an	event,	which	was	a	watering	by	the	gardener	of	my	flowers.”	It	follows	that,	if	(1)	and	(1’)	are	synony-mous,	and	(1)	is	about	the	gardener	and	/	or	my	flowers,	so	is	(1’).	However,	does	the	fact	that	(1’)	quantifies	over	events	show	that	it	(and	hence	(1)	as	well)	“serves	to	denote	an	event”,	a	watering	action	of	the	gardener,	as	Schaffer	claims?	Not	in	the	same	sense	of	“about”	that	makes	it	natural	to	say	that	“a	is	F”	is	about	a.	We	have	to	tread	 carefully	here.	 If	 quantified	 sentences	are	 “about”	 the	entities	 they	quantify	over,	then	(1’)	is	not	about	“an	event”,	but	about	all	events,	and	it	says	that	at	least	one	of	them,	possibly	all	satisfy	the	indefinite	property	of	being	a	watering	by	the	gardener	of	my	flowers.20	This	formulation	makes	clear	that	(1’)	neither	identifies	a	single	event	nor	asserts	the	existence	of	a	single	event.	This	is	true	even	if,	as	a	mat-ter	of	contingent	historical	fact,	there	happened	to	be	one	and	only	one	act	of	water-ing	of	my	flowers	by	the	gardener.21	Even	if	the	gardener	had	watered	my	flowers	only	once,	(1’)	would	not	denote,	describe	or	be	about	this	action.	“Something”	is	no	more	 or	 no	 less	 referential	 than	 “nothing”.	 It	 is	 therefore	 false	 to	 say	 that	 (1’)	“serves	to	denote	an	event”,	a	positive	and	possibly	causal	presence,	whereas	(1’)’s	negation	and	contradictory	(Neg_1’)	does	not	“serve	to	denote	an	event”,	and	is	at	best	“about”	a	causally	impotent	absence.	Generally	speaking,	sentences	of	the	form	“Something	 is	 (not)	F”	are	 in	 the	same	boat	as	 those	of	 the	 form	“Nothing	 is	F”	 in	terms	of	reference	and	denotation.	Either	both	“denote”	something,	or	neither	does.	If	so,	Schaffer’s	distinction	between	widest	and	narrower	scope	meanings	looses	its	point.	 However,	 let’s	 assume	 that	 Schaffer’s	 semantics	 for	 omission	 sentences	 is	correct	and	does	undergird	his	distinction	between	non-referential	and	referential	omission	sentences.	 If	 so,	absence	 talk	 is	not	necessarily	about	absences,	but	 “can	be	a	way	to	describe	something”	(4.2).	Is	this	enough	to	solve	our	problems	about																																																									20	Cp.	also	the	alternative	formulations	mentioned	in	§6	above.	21	Schaffer’s	example	“James	killed	Smith”	may	mislead	in	this	respect,	since	we	tend	to	assume	tacit-ly	that	Smith	is	a	human	person,	and	we	know	that	human	persons	can	only	be	killed	once.	Given	this	assumption	and	the	medical	fact,	the	singularity	of	the	“something”	asserted	to	exist	happens	to	be	guaranteed	by	 the	sense	of	 the	predicate.	But	what	 if	Smith	 is	a	cat	with	nine	 lives,	which	may	be	killed	repeatedly?	That	is	one	reason	I	prefer	the	example	“The	gardener	watered	my	flowers”.	It	is	free	of	such	temptations.	
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absence	causation,	as	Schaffer	claims?	Schaffer	says	that	the	“metaphysical	problem	disappears.	 When	 I	 truly	 claim	 that	 the	 gardener’s	 failing	 to	 water	 my	 flowers	caused	them	to	wilt,	I	need	only	be	read	as	describing	the	cause	with	the	negation	taking	some	narrower	scope,	to	be	speaking	of	something”	(4.2).	My	third	and	last	objection	is	that	Schaffer’s	solution	let’s	us	down	in	an	area	where	omission	claims	play	a	vital	role,	viz.	in	normative	contexts.	When	omission	claims	are	used	to	sup-port	a	normative	judgment	of	praise	or	blame,	Schaffer’s	semantic	recommendation	to	simply	read	the	speaker	as	describing	the	cause,	 for	example,	along	the	lines	of	(Truism)	or	(OtherDoings),	is	counterproductive.		Let’s	assume	that	I	sue	the	gardener	for	negligently	killing	my	flowers	by	not	watering	them	in	a	court	of	law,	and	he	has	the	nerve	to	deny	my	charge,	claiming	that	he	diligently	watered	my	flowers	without	 fail.	To	support	my	charge,	 I	call	 to	the	witness	stand	an	expert	–	a	floral	coroner,	as	it	were	–	who	testifies:	“That	the	gardener	omitted	to	(did	not)	water	your	flowers	caused	them	to	wilt.”	According	to	Schaffer,	what	he	says	can	only	be	true	if	he	speaks	of	something,	so	the	jury	has	to	interpret	the	embedded	omission	sentence	as	expressing	a	narrower	scope	mean-ing.	So	they	take	him	to	mean,	say	(CauseTruism)		 That	 there	was	an	event,	which	was	not	a	watering	by	the	gardener	of	my	flowers	caused	them	to	wilt.	On	 this	 interpretation,	 the	 jury	 understands	 the	 expert	 as	 testifying	 that	 at	 least	one,	perhaps	all	events	in	the	history	of	the	universe	which	are	not	waterings	by	the	gardener	of	my	flowers	are	the	cause	of	death	of	my	flowers.	The	problem	is	that,	even	if	what	he	says	were	true,	this	truth	is	compatible	with	the	gardener’s	diligent-ly	watering	my	flowers	all	the	time,	as	his	lawyer	will	be	quick	to	point	out.	Another	possible	narrow	scope	meaning	of	the	expert’s	testimony	is		(CauseOtherDoings)	 That	 there	was	something	done	by	the	gardener	to	my	flowers	which	was	not	a	watering	caused	them	to	wilt.	On	this	reading,	the	jury	takes	the	expert	as	identifying	as	the	cause	of	death	of	my	flowers	as	at	least	one,	perhaps	all	of	the	events	in	the	history	of	the	universe	that	satisfy	the	condition	of	being	things	the	gardener	did	to	my	flowers	which	were	not	waterings.	Again,	one	of	the	problems	with	that	is	that	it	does	nothing	to	negate	and	contradict	the	gardener’s	counterclaim	that	he	did	water	my	flowers	–	and	similar	for	all	narrower	scope	meanings.	
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	 The	 dilemma	 that	 Schaffer’s	 solution	 creates	 is	 clear:	 If	 the	 jury	 takes	 the	subject	 term	 of	 the	 expert’s	 causal	 omission	 sentence	 as	 having	 its	widest	 scope	(Neg_1)	meaning,	it	cannot	be	true.	But	if	they	take	it	as	having	any	of	the	narrower	scope	meanings,	such	as	(Truism),	(OtherDoings)	or	any	other,	it	cannot	bolster	my	charge	 of	 negligence	 since	 it	 fails	 to	 contradict	 the	 basic	 commission	 sentence.	Shouldn’t	an	adequate	solution	of	 the	problem	of	absence	causation	avoid	 this	di-lemma	and	allow	for	omission	claims	to	support	normative	judgment	of	blame	and	responsibility?	 I	 think	 it	 should.	For	 this	 and	 the	other	 reasons	mentioned,	 I	 con-clude	that	Schaffer’s	solution	fails.				
